13 "there is no evidence that anti-Communism was a motivating factor in the acceptance of a small number of Indochinese refugees in 1975. Indeed, it appeared that Canada did not wish to become too closely involved in a situation which was interpreted as being the result of American involvement in the Vietnam War. The Americans, Australians, and French were left to deal with the refugee situation after the fall of Saigon, and Canada provided only a token residual role, partly to serve as a lever for the United Nations to involve other countries, and partly to keep Canadian authorities informed through a direct active presence. … it was aimed at filling an international responsibility in a token way rather than serving the refugees, the evidence for the role of public pressure is very slight. Media coverage of the program and public concern with it seem negligible. … if Canada had announced a large aid program, there might have been considerable antagonism from numerous Canadians unsympathetic to the war in Vietnam. … In sum, political factors, both domestic and international, seem to have been the main determinants of the decision. Anti-Communism was not a factor: if anything, anti-Americanism was."

15 "Initially, Canada’s selection criteria were based on finding and dealing sympathetically 'with Vietnamese boat escapees who had been sponsored or nominated by relatives in Canada.' This was expanded in 1976; first priority was given to 'boat escapees having Canadian connections but lacking formal sponsorships.' It was not until January 12, 1977, that the CEIC Asia and Pacific Bureau (IFAP) advised “that boat escapees no longer needed to have a connection with Canada in order to be selected.”

25 [In late 1977] Canadian officials began to realize that the continuing flow of refugees from Vietnam was not a direct result of the conclusion of the Vietnam War. … Humanitarianism was beginning to play a role alongside international pressure, but there was still little evidence of interest in the refugee program, either by the media or the public."

235 "[In July] The target to the end of 1980 was set at 50,000 [this time including sponsored refugees]. This bold initiative was a generous response to the combination of public pressure and media coverage, a response by civil servants and government
leaders who were already favourably disposed and were motivated in large part by humanitarian concerns; and it reflected a new phenomenon on the domestic front—the explosive development of the private sponsorship movement."

240 "The refugee mix was also affected by the selection policies of other nations. For example, in Hong Kong the greater proportion of refugees were from Northern Vietnam compared to Malaysia or Thailand, simply because of the escape routes available. As the United States would not consider taking any refugees from Northern Vietnam, Canada accepted a disproportionate share of them."